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UPDATING THE SOCIAL NETWORK:  
HOW OUTDATED AND UNCLEAR STATE 
LEGISLATION VIOLATES SEX OFFENDERS’ 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Elizabeth Tolon* 
 
Readily available on computers, phones, tablets, or television, social 
media has become a necessary platform of expression for many.  But, for 
others, social media is an inaccessible tool whose very use has criminal 
repercussions. 
To protect innocent children, many states have enacted legislation 
restricting sex offenders’ access to social media.  Unfortunately, this 
legislation is often outdated, overly restrictive, and unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment.  North Carolina has recently attracted national 
attention, as its statute highlights the potential constitutional issues states 
face in drafting such legislation.  To avoid the constitutional concerns that 
North Carolina faces, state legislators must draft statutes narrowly and 
provide ample alternative channels of communication for sex offenders. 
This Note first analyzes current state legislation restricting sex offenders’ 
social media usage, focusing specifically on North Carolina’s statute.  It 
then discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Packingham v. North Carolina, 
challenging the constitutionality of North Carolina’s statute under the First 
Amendment.  This Note explains how Packingham offers the Supreme Court 
an opportunity to clarify and instruct states on how to properly draft future 
legislation.  Specifically, the Court must address what constitutes a 
narrowly tailored statute and what type of alternatives must be available 
for sex offenders whose social media access is restricted.  This Note 
ultimately concludes that North Carolina’s statute is not narrowly tailored 
and does not leave ample alternative channels of communication.  To help 
avoid these issues in the future, this Note concludes by suggesting a model 
statute for constitutionally restricting sex offenders’ social media use. 
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I would also like to thank Tom McInerney, Harlem Boo Radley, the Study Group, my sweet 
family, and the entire Fordham Law Review for their help in preparing this Note. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social media is readily accessible at all times—on computers, tablets, 
phones, and even watches.  Society depends on these websites to attend 
social gatherings, catch up with old friends, receive news updates, and 
express opinions.  But imagine a world without social media.  No 
invitations to gatherings, important or immediate news notifications, or 
personal online profiles.  For some individuals, this is reality. 
As a condition of release, many registered sex offenders are restricted 
from accessing social networking websites.1  Courts, parole boards, parole 
officers, and state legislation impose this condition (along with other 
conditions, such as registry requirements, residency restrictions, and 
employment restrictions) to protect the public, and specifically children, 
from sex offenders.2  The compelling public desire to keep children safe 
from potential abusers fuels these restrictions.  The motivation behind 
social media bans is the desire to bar sex offenders from the virtual 
communities where children congregate.  Consequently, many offenders are 
restricted from using much of the Internet, one of the leading mediums of 
expression.3 
The Internet and social networking websites are crucial to individual 
expression.4  Social networking websites have revolutionized the way 
individuals communicate, share ideas, market their businesses, strategize, 
and protest.5  Because these mediums have become essential tools of 
expression, any statute restricting access risks a First Amendment 
challenge.6 
For some registered sex offenders, these restrictions may seem 
appropriate; the offender’s underlying crime might have involved a minor, 
inappropriate communication over the Internet, or both.  For other 
offenders—those who had no contact with a minor or did not use the 
Internet in the facilitation of their crime—these conditions are harsh and 
overbroad.  It is this latter group of offenders whose First Amendment 
rights may be in jeopardy:  the restrictions are insufficiently tailored 
 
 1. See infra Part III.B–D. 
 2. Although discretionary conditions imposed on sex offenders by judges, parole 
boards, and parole officers provide an interesting discourse, this Note focuses on state 
legislation restricting sex offenders from accessing social networking sites.  This Note does 
not address the current circuit split regarding various discretionary conditions exercised by 
nonlegislative bodies.  For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see generally Krista L. 
Blaisdell, Note, Protecting the Playgrounds of the Twenty-First Century:  Analyzing 
Computer and Internet Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1155 
(2009) (discussing the varying approaches to postconviction release hearings for Internet sex 
offenders). 
 3. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 4. See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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because they apply to those who pose no risk to children and fail to leave 
open adequate alternatives for these individuals to communicate. 
Some states, like New York and Texas, have passed legislation that 
successfully balances public safety concerns with sex offenders’ First 
Amendment rights.7  Other states, like Indiana and Nebraska, however, 
have enacted flawed laws, many of which were ultimately struck down for 
being overly restrictive.8  The wide spectrum of laws limiting sex 
offenders’ access to social media demonstrates the confusion over how 
states can regulate sex offenders’ speech without raising constitutional 
concerns.9  One state in particular, North Carolina, has recently garnered 
national attention10 for prohibiting all registered sex offenders, regardless of 
the sexual offense, from using a wide array of social networking websites.11  
A registered sex offender challenged the law after he was convicted for 
using Facebook.12  The U.S. Supreme Court will hear his case in early 
2017.13  The Court will address whether the statute, which restricts all 
registered sex offenders from accessing a wide array of social networking 
websites, is constitutional under the First Amendment.14  This case presents 
the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify how the First Amendment 
may impose limitations on state legislation restricting sex offenders’ right 
to access social networking websites. 
This Note examines the issues states face when drafting legislation 
prohibiting sex offenders from using social media.  Part I discusses the 
evolution of sex offender legislation and how the advent of the Internet has 
affected this evolving body of law.  Next, Part II examines current state 
legislation restricting sex offenders’ access to social networking sites, 
focusing on North Carolina’s statute.  It also analyzes relevant First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Then, Part III discusses the issues presented in 
State v. Packingham,15 the Supreme Court case challenging the 
constitutionality of North Carolina’s statute and offers suggestions as to 
how the Supreme Court can resolve these issues.  Finally, Part IV proposes 
a model statute and commentary for states drafting similar legislation. 
 
 7. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-b) (McKinney 2011); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 508.1861(a)–(b) (West 2015); see also infra notes 126–40 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part II.D and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Part II.C–D. 
 10. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Will Consider Constitutionality of Law 
Banning Sex Offenders from Social Media, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 31, 2016, 3:26 PM), http:// 
www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_will_consider_constitutionality_of_law_b
anning_sex_offenders [https://perma.cc/L5RN-H7GR]. 
 11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2009). 
 12. See State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 
S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016); see also infra Part III. 
 13. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 368. 
 14. See Brief for the Petitioner at i, Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 15-1194), 2016 
WL 7321777, at *i. 
 15. 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). 
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I:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION 
Sex offender legislation has emerged as a prominent issue in recent years 
as public concern for child welfare has risen.16  Congress enacted the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as part of the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 to keep children safe from 
sexual predators who may live in their neighborhood, city, or county.17  
Under SORNA, every state must have a sex offender registry that adheres 
to the SORNA guidelines.18  Beyond these guidelines, states have wide 
autonomy to craft registry requirements and laws regulating registered 
offenders, including laws restricting access to social networking websites.19 
To understand why state legislation may conflict with the First 
Amendment, it is important to understand how these statutes came into 
existence and from where they derive their authority.  Part I.A. explores 
how federal legislation sets the minimum requirements that states must 
impose on sex offenders. It explores the state response to these 
requirements and how the rise of the Internet has impacted state legislation.  
Then, Part I.B. examines how states have responded to Internet crimes by 
restricting sex offenders’ access to specific websites. 
A.  The Evolution of Sex Offender Legislation 
SORNA mandates a nationwide sex offender registry with penalties for 
sex offenders who fail to register.20  States that fail to comply with SORNA 
lose ten percent of their annual funds from the Edward Byrne Memorial 
Justice Assistance Grant Program (JAG).21  To avoid losing federal 
funding, states are required to overhaul their sex offender registry to meet 
SORNA’s minimum requirements,22 including maintaining a minimum risk 
classification system for sex offenders,23 which states have generally 
done.24  SORNA also allows states to impose more stringent requirements, 
and this discretion has led to wide variations in sex offender legislation.25  
 
 16. See John E.B. Meyers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L. 
Q. 449, 460–62 (2008). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012).  The Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
establishes community notifications, registry requirements, and state legislation 
requirements. See id.; see also Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA) at 10 Years:  History, Implementation, and the Future, 64 DRAKE 
L. REV. 741, 749–50 (2016). 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 16912. 
 19. Id.; see also infra Part II.D. 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 16922. 
 21. See id. § 16925(a).  For more information about the JAG Program, see NATHAN 
JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22416, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE 
GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM 2 (2013). 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a). 
 23. See id. §§ 16911–16912. 
 24. For a list of jurisdictions that have successfully implemented SORNA, see SORNA 
Implementation Status, SMART, http://ojp.gov/smart/sorna-map.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/LM3K-7QAU]. 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 16912. 
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An interesting example of how states have varied in their implementation of 
SORNA’s requirements is their treatment of the tiered system. 
SORNA establishes three tiers of sex offender classifications in the 
federal system, which are based on the severity of the convicted offense and 
determine the type of restrictions offenders face upon release.26  States are 
also required to establish a similar tiered system,27 but they may determine 
how to integrate the offenses listed in SORNA, as each tier of offenses is 
subject to corollary registration requirements.28  This is important for the 
purpose of this Note because states who have implemented constitutional 
social media restrictions have restricted access in correlation to the sex 
offenders’ tier or risk level, as suggested by SORNA.29  In contrast, states 
who have failed to implement constitutional restrictions on sex offenders’ 
social media use have similarly failed to integrate risk level or tier status 
into determining whether a sex offender is granted social media access.30  
This results from the amount of variation states are permitted under 
SORNA. 
Because SORNA mandates only the minimum registry requirements and 
permits states to implement harsher restrictions, there is considerable 
variation among how states implement these requirements.  For example, 
New York classifies offenders based on crime of conviction combined with 
several other factors,31 while Pennsylvania classifies offenders based on 
crime of conviction alone.32  Thus, depending on the state, some sex 
offenders who have been convicted of the same underlying offense may 
have to comply with fewer restrictions than others.  If a sex offender is 
classified as “high risk,” he may be required to provide to the state his 
entire criminal history, as well as his DNA, driver’s license and passport 
information, employment information, phone numbers, online Internet 
identifiers, physical description, professional licensing information, 
addresses of both personal residences and school residences (if applicable), 
social security number, and any vehicle information.33  States are permitted 
to require even more information than this from sex offenders upon 
release.34 
 
 26. See id. § 16917(a). 
 27. See id. §§ 16911–16912. 
 28. See Lori McPherson, Practitioner’s Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, 20 UPDATE, nos. 
9–10, 2007, at 1, 2, http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/update_vol_20_no_9_10_2007.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/42DL-6X6H]. 
 29. See infra notes 126–40 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Part II.D. 
 31. For example, New York considers the offender’s criminal history.  It also determines 
risk level based on a court’s assessment of whether the offender is likely to repeat the same 
or a similar offense and the danger the offender poses to the community. See Risk Level & 
Designation Determination, DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, http://www.criminal 
justice.ny.gov/nsor/risk_levels.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/P4YY-
Z68K]. 
 32. See Megan’s Law Website, PA. ST. POLICE, https://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us/ 
FAQ.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SML6-4YBG]. 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 16914 (2012). 
 34. See id. § 16912; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(3) (2015) (providing that 
registered sex offenders must present signed written notice of plans to travel outside the 
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Understanding the tiered system and the resulting restrictive conditions 
placed upon sex offenders helps to provide context for demonstrating how 
further limitations, such as restricting Internet access, may go too far.  For 
example, while some states have unsuccessfully attempted to ban sex 
offenders from using the Internet entirely,35 many states have enacted 
legislation that restricts the use of certain websites, such as social 
networking websites.36  In response, registered sex offenders brought 
actions challenging the statutes’ constitutionality under the First 
Amendment,37 Due Process Clause,38 Ex Post Facto Clause,39 and the 
Fourth Amendment.40 
These challenges highlight the possibility that states have gone too far in 
their restrictions and that, specifically, restricted Internet access is cause for 
extreme concern.  To understand how statutes impact registered sex 
offenders by restricting their social media usage, this Note next examines 
the rise of the Internet and its prevailing use in society. 
 
country at least twenty-one days prior to travel and must include their names, passport 
numbers, and destinations, as well as itinerary details including departure and return dates, 
means of travel, and reasons for travel). 
 35. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding an 
Internet prohibition where the defendant had used Internet communication to encourage 
exploitation of children); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(upholding a postrelease ban on Internet use where the defendant had been convicted of 
receiving child pornography and had also engaged in sexual relations with an underage girl 
he had met via email). 
 36. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-b) (McKinney 2011); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 508.1861(a)–(b) (West 2015). 
 37. See infra Part II.B. 
 38. See State v. D.M., No. 110822401, 2013 WL 1845596, at *9 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2013) 
(holding that automatic and mandatory registration and notification provisions within the 
Delaware statute, as applied to juvenile offenders, were constitutional and did not violate the 
procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment or the state constitution). 
But see Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (M.D. La. 2012) (concluding that the 
Louisiana statute that restricted registered sex offenders from using or accessing social 
networking websites, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks was void for vagueness in 
failing to clarify which websites were prohibited). 
 39. See Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that the statute 
requiring the offender to disclose his Internet identifiers imposed only a civil burden upon 
sex offenders). But see Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1125 (D. Neb. 2012) 
(finding that criminalizing sex offender registrants’ use of social networking websites, and 
requiring disclosure of Internet identifiers, was intended to punish sex offenders, and 
therefore violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
 40. See White v. Baker, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that a 
statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment by requiring former sex offenders to provide 
Internet email addresses, usernames, and passwords to law enforcement personnel, because 
the required disclosed information had already been reported to third parties and was 
publicly available on the Internet). But see Doe v. Prosecutor, 566 F. Supp. 2d 862, 882 
(S.D. Ind. 2008) (holding that Indiana’s statute that required offenders not currently on 
parole, probation or under court supervision to consent to installing hardware or software on 
personal computers at the offender’s expense was unconstitutional). 
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B.  The Rise of the Internet in Society Today 
Readily available on computers, phones, tablets, or television, the 
Internet has become a necessary commodity for many.41  For others, the 
Internet is an inaccessible tool, the use of which may have criminal 
repercussions.42  This section discusses the importance of the Internet in 
society and describes the criminal penalties imposed on sex offenders for 
using it. 
1.  The Internet:  Can’t Live Without It, Yet Some Do 
The Internet significantly increases the ability to find, manage, and share 
information.43  Specifically, social networking websites were designed to 
encourage communication and interactions between friends, families, and 
colleagues.44  Further, these sites allow many individuals to express their 
opinions and beliefs on a common platform while also gathering relevant 
news and information.45  Americans use social networking sites for work, 
professional development, or to seek employment.46  Sites like LinkedIn 
have become popular with college graduates and high-income earners.47  
Social networking websites have gained tremendous traction in the business 
world; a recent study found that 70 percent of business marketers acquired 
customers through Facebook.48  Given the rise of the Internet and social 
media use in all facets of daily life, it is evident that it has become an 
important tool of expression, hence why restricting its usage can be 
damaging.  Considering its value and usage in daily life, it is crucial to 
understand why social media restrictions are permissible in some cases but 
not others. 
 
 41. See Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Council), Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, ¶¶ 20–22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (declaring Internet 
access an inherent right). 
 42. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 43. See Kristin Purcell & Lee Raine, Americans Feel Better Informed Thanks to the 
Internet, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.pewInternet.org/2014/12/08/better-
informed/ [https://perma.cc/DHX4-X9HS]. 
 44. See Jonathon Hitz, Removing Disfavored Faces from Facebook:  The Freedom of 
Speech Implications of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Media, 89 IND. L.J. 1327, 1332 
(2014). 
 45. For example, more than half of the American public turned to these sites to learn 
about the 2016 American presidential election. See Shannon Greenwood et al., Social Media 
Update 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.pewInternet.org/2016/11/11/ 
social-media-update-2016/#fn-17239-1 [https://perma.cc/NKS7-TWUH]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. For example, half of adults who have college degrees use LinkedIn, compared with 
27 percent of individuals who attended but have not graduated from college. Id. 
 48. See id.; see also Businesses on Social Media—Statistics and Trends, GO-GULF 
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.go-gulf.ae/blog/businesses-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EMH5-5VP7]. 
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2.  A Deviant Use:  Sex Offenders and the Internet 
Prohibiting sex offenders from using the Internet after they have served 
time for their crimes may strike some as an exaggerated response to the 
threats they pose, especially because the Internet has become such a crucial 
part of daily life.  The Internet, however, also facilitates crimes.49  
Generally, criminals use the Internet to commit a wide variety of crimes, 
from commonplace acts of misconduct50 to acts of terrorism.51  Sex 
offenders in particular use the Internet to commit crimes because it allows 
them to create anonymous identities and evade the attention of authorities.52 
The ease of communication through email, instant message sites, or live 
electronic programs allows sex offenders to meet up with unsuspecting 
internet users and to find people who have the same criminal proclivities.53  
For example, providers of child pornography are difficult to track because 
of their anonymity on the Internet, which contributes to the increasing 
exploitation of children.54  Furthermore, child pornography had been 
virtually eliminated in the United States before the advent of the Internet.55  
 
 49. See Ilia Kolochenko, Cybercrime:  The Price of Inequality, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2016, 
9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2016/12/19/cybercrime-the-price-
of-inequality/print/ [https://perma.cc/3FZ4-TDLF]. 
 50. See, e.g., James M. Sellers, Comment, The Black Market and Intellectual Property:  
A Potential Sherman Act Section Two Antitrust Defense?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 583, 
587–88 (2004). 
 51. See, e.g., Seth R. Merl, Note, Internet Communication Standards for the 21st 
Century:  International Terrorism Must Force the U.S. to Adopt “Carnivore” and New 
Electronic Surveillance Standards, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 245, 248 (2001). 
 52. See generally Jay Krasovec, Comment, Cyberspace:  The Final Frontier, for 
Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101 (1997) (discussing methods that many utilize to remain 
anonymous on the Internet). 
 53. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that the 
defendant interacted with other sexual offenders on the Internet prior to committing his 
crimes); see also Meiring de Villiers, Free Radicals in Cyberspace:  Complex Liability 
Issues in Information Warfare, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 13, 39 (2005) (noting that the 
degree of anonymity on the Internet “embolden[s] cybercriminals to commit crimes they 
would not otherwise consider”). 
 54. See Robyn Forman Pollack, Comment, Creating the Standards of a Global 
Community:  Regulating Pornography on the Internet—An International Concern, 10 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 467, 478–80 (1996) (discussing several cases in which sex offenders 
used the Internet to select their victims). 
 55. By the middle of the 1980s, trafficking of child pornography within the United 
States was almost completely eliminated through federal law, which prevented the creation, 
possession, or dissemination of child pornography. See Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
(June 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/child-pornography [https://perma.cc/ 
RQ38-9B4W].  There were a number of successful anti-child pornography campaigns waged 
by law enforcement, which rendered the production, purchase, and trade of child 
pornography both difficult and expensive. See id.  Anonymous distribution and receipt was 
nearly impossible, and it was difficult for child pornography seeking or producing 
individuals to locate and interact with each other. See id.  The rise of the Internet created an 
explosion within the child pornography market. See id.  For the first time, online 
communication made possible anonymous meetings of people with sexual attractions to 
children. See Kurt Eichenwald, A Shadowy Trade Migrates to the Web, N.Y. TIMES  
(Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/19/business/19kidswebhistory.html 
[https://perma.cc/H3BE-E52Q].  Consequently, the Internet revived the market for child 
pornography and allowed for the collection and trading of such materials with, as one author 
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Because the Internet has provided a tool for some sex offenders to engage 
in criminal behavior, it is understandable that legislatures would have an 
interest in banning its use among convicted sex offenders.56 
II:  A DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS:  
THE STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
Many states have enacted broad legislation restricting sex offenders’ 
access to social networking websites to protect children from online 
predators.57  States differ in determining which specific category of sex 
offense may trigger a social media ban and which websites are prohibited.58  
Some states restrict sex offenders’ access to social networking websites 
regardless of underlying offenses or whether the offense had any connection 
to the Internet.59  Other states have tailored their statutes more narrowly and 
limit offenders’ use of social media based upon their previous criminal 
conduct.60  When individuals challenge these restrictions, courts are forced 
to balance public safety concerns with registered sex offenders’ 
constitutional rights.61 
First, Part II.A analyzes the First Amendment jurisprudence necessary to 
determine the constitutionality of current legislation.  Next, Part II.B 
examines the spectrum of approaches states take in restricting sex 
offenders’ access to social networking websites.  Part II.C discusses state 
statutes that restrict only certain individuals and social networking websites, 
while Part II.D examines state statutes that broadly restrict social media 
access and, as such, have failed under the First Amendment.  Part II 
concludes by focusing on how North Carolina’s statute fits along this 
spectrum. 
 
put it, “the vigor and obsession usually found among baseball card enthusiasts.” Id.  The 
Internet made production of child pornography easy and inexpensive and allowed 
individuals to create, access, and share child sexual abuse images with ease and anonymity. 
See Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
ceos/child-pornography [https://perma.cc/RQ38-9B4W].  Today, child pornography is 
readily available through almost every Internet outlet including websites, email, instant 
messaging, newsgroups, message boards, peer-to-peer networks, and social networking 
websites. See id. 
 56. Although beyond the scope of this Note, many social networking sites, such as 
Facebook and Instagram, have barred sex offenders from their websites. See e.g., Statement 
of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/terms 
[https://perma.cc/ACU7-HNNC].  Facebook explicitly bans access by sex offenders in its 
terms of service, whereas Twitter, Snapchat, LinkedIn, Kik, and other websites permit sex 
offenders. See id.; see also Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, (Sept. 30, 2016) https:// 
twitter.com/tos?lang=en [https://perma.cc/M73A-XNDL]; User Agreement, LINKEDIN, (Oct. 
23, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement [https://perma.cc/U6EP-CAHT]; 
Snap Inc. Terms of Service, SNAP, INC., https://www.snap.com/en-US/terms/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CK2T-5KKQ]; Terms of Service, KIK, (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.kik.com/terms/#changesection [https://perma.cc/TW5R-XNLK]. 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
 58. See infra Part II.B–D. 
 59. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2009). 
 60. See MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-b) (McKinney 
2011); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)–(b) (West 2015). 
 61. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Prohibitions on Internet Usage 
Under the First Amendment 
The First Amendment governs the individual right of free speech and 
expression—one of the bedrock principles upon which this country was 
founded.62  Over time, the Supreme Court has crafted a framework to 
determine whether state action has infringed upon an individual’s right to 
free speech and expression.  This section reviews that framework to aid in 
determining the constitutionality of North Carolina’s sex offender statute. 
1.  How Courts Evaluate Free Speech Challenges 
Faced with a First Amendment challenge, courts often balance the 
government’s interest against the burdened individual’s rights.63  The 
greater the burden imposed on individual rights, the stronger the 
government interest must be for a statute to be constitutional.64  Courts 
must balance these interests when reviewing First Amendment challenges 
to statutes.65 
Courts review alleged First Amendment violations with differing levels 
of scrutiny.66  Statutes regulating speech are either content-based 
regulations or content-neutral regulations of speech.67  Content-based 
statutes regulate speech on the face of the statute and upon the speech 
expressed.68  For example, a law that prohibits offensive speech is content 
based because it restricts speech based on the message or type of words 
conveyed.69  If the Court finds a statute content based, strict scrutiny 
applies, which requires the statute to serve a compelling government 
interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.70  Although the 
 
 62. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 146, 161 (1939) 
(stating that the freedom of speech and press are fundamental rights, and courts have the 
duty to balance these rights against regulation). 
 63. See State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 749 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
368 (2016). 
 64. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (holding that concert 
restrictions in a public park were constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions because 
they adequately balanced individual rights with legitimate government interests); see also 
Eva Conner, Why Don’t You Take a Seat Away from That Computer?:  Why Louisiana 
Revised Statute 14:91.5 Is Unconstitutional, 73 LA. L. REV. 883, 903 (2013).  For a good 
example of the Court balancing these interests, see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 65. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 66. See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine:  Strict 
Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291–
92 (2016). 
 67. See id. at 295. 
 68. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 69. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
382. 
 70. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); Erznoznik v. 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (stating that the government cannot selectively 
censor offensive speech under the First Amendment). 
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government interest may be incredibly strong, it is very difficult for statutes 
to pass strict scrutiny.71 
In contrast, a statute is content neutral if it regulates speech or expression 
without reference to the message conveyed.72  For example, a law that 
regulates the volume level of a concert held in a public square is content 
neutral because it does not regulate the content of the music even if it 
affects how the music is expressed.73  These content-neutral regulations are 
often sorted into two categories:  (1) time, place, or manner restrictions and 
(2) expressive conduct restrictions.74  Time, place, or manner restrictions 
restrict the how the speech is expressed but not the speech itself.75  If the 
regulation is a time, place, or manner restriction, intermediate scrutiny 
applies, requiring the statute to (1) serve a significant governmental interest, 
(2) be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and (3) leave open ample 
alternative channels for communicating the information.76  The previous 
example of a restriction on a concert’s volume level is an example of a 
time, place, and manner restriction. 
Alternatively, content-neutral regulations that restrict expressive conduct 
and incidentally burden speech are also evaluated under intermediate 
scrutiny, though under a different standard.77  If a court determines that a 
statute regulates conduct in a content-neutral manner, it will apply the four-
factor test from United States v. O’Brien78 to determine whether the statute 
is sufficiently justified.79  In O’Brien, the Supreme Court found that when 
speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, the regulation is permissible if  
it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.80 
This standard differs from the time, place, manner restrictions because it 
targets expressive or symbolic conduct, (such as burning a draft to protest a 
war)81 that may not rise to the level of protected speech but still is afford 
 
 71. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) 
(noting that the government has a very strong and compelling interest in protecting citizens 
during elections from coercion and confusion). 
 72. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. See State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 743 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
368 (2016).  This threshold determination is not always present, but the initial question of 
conduct versus speech continues to be a central feature of First Amendment doctrine. See 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); see also Note, Free Speech Doctrine After 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1988–90 (2016). 
 75. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796. 
 76. See id. at 791. 
 77. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 78. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 79. See id. at 377. 
 80. Id. at 376–77. 
 81. See generally id. 
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some First Amendment protection.82  In total, hurdling over the 
constitutional bar is easier for content-neutral restrictions than content-
based restrictions, but the government must still articulate a legitimate 
government interest and show an adequate balance between its interest and 
the speech interests.83 
One of the more difficult issues courts face is what level of constitutional 
protection speech on the Internet is afforded. When the government 
regulates internet expression, individuals challenge the statutes for violating 
their constitutional rights.84  The arguments challenging Internet bans have 
helped clarify what level, if any, of constitutional protection is afforded to 
speech over the Internet. 
2.  Is Anything Really Free?:  
The Constitution’s Protection for Free Speech on the Internet 
As the Internet has become a leading platform for expression, courts 
grapple with whether access to the Internet should be considered a 
fundamental right or, at least, a medium of speech afforded constitutional 
protection.  While the United Nations has declared Internet access an 
inherent right,85 the Supreme Court has not yet recognized access to the 
Internet as an individual right but has acknowledged that speech conducted 
on the Internet implicates the First Amendment.86  Although Internet speech 
is protected by the Constitution, it is unclear whether registered sex 
 
 82. Id. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of 
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends 
thereby to express an idea. . . .  This Court has held that when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ 
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.”). 
 83. See State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 749 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
368 (2016). 
 84. See United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding lifetime 
limitation on use of Internet, in light of less restrictive alternatives, a “greater restraint of 
liberty than is reasonably necessary”); United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 409 (3d Cir. 
2010) (stating that prohibiting access to any Internet service provider, bulletin board system, 
or other public or private computer network for the rest of a defendant’s life is too broad 
given “alternative, less restrictive, means of controlling Heckman’s post-release behavior,” 
including computer monitoring paid for by defendant). 
 85. See La Rue, supra note 41, ¶¶ 20–22. 
 86. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“The Internet can hardly be 
considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity. . . .  Through the use of chat rooms, any person 
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could 
from any soap box. . . .  [O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”); see also Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (recognizing that the First Amendment protections 
extend to new forms of speech and expression, and noting “‘the basic principles of freedom 
of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ when a new and 
different medium for communication appears” (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 503 (1952))); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (“The 
Internet . . . offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities 
for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.” (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(a)(3) (Supp. 1996))). 
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offenders enjoy the same amount of constitutional protection that average 
internet users do. 
a.  Free Speech and Its Limits for Felons 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the limits of registered sex 
offenders’ First Amendment rights.  However, the Supreme Court has 
addressed the First Amendment rights of prisoners in two cases:  Pell v. 
Procunier87 and Beard v. Banks.88  These cases provide a brief overview of 
current jurisprudence regarding the First Amendment rights of incarcerated 
prisoners and their sliding spectrum of constitutional protection.89  
Although prisoners and sex offenders are not in identical situations, they 
share similar limitations of rights.  This analysis of prisoners’ rights 
provides context for registered sex offenders’ First Amendment rights; if 
prisoners can have their speech rights curbed to ensure public safety, sex 
offenders may be subjected to speech limitations as well. 
For example, in Pell, the Court held that the prison’s policy to deny 
prisoners permission to interview with journalists did not violate the 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights.90  In contrast to a narrowly tailored 
analysis or an O’Brien analysis91 the Court found that “a prison inmate 
retains [only] those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with 
his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 
corrections system.”92  Individuals retain their constitutional rights while 
imprisoned, but certain rights may be restricted or denied for the safety of 
the prison environment.93  The Court reasoned that the safety concerns of 
face-to-face interviews and the resulting potential discipline issues 
outweighed the prisoners’ right to communicate with the journalists.94  The 
Court found that prisoners had alternative channels of communication,95 so 
the prisoners’ freedom of speech was sufficiently protected and the First 
Amendment was not violated.96 
Similarly, in Beard, the Supreme Court reiterated Pell’s notion that 
imprisonment does not deprive prisoners of constitutional protection, but 
sometimes a greater restriction of such rights and are allowed in prison than 
would be permitted elsewhere.97  The Beard Court held that the prison’s 
policy of prohibiting prisoners from reading newspapers, magazines, and 
keeping personal photographs did not violate their First Amendment 
 
 87. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
 88. 548 U.S. 521 (2006). 
 89. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that a prison regulation 
impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights is valid if it is reasonably relates to legitimate 
penological interests). 
 90. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 827–28. 
 91. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 92. Pell, 417 U.S. at 822. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 827. 
 95. See id. at 827–28. 
 96. See id. at 828. 
 97. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 528. 
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rights.98  The Court justified this conclusion by stating that the need to 
strictly monitor and hold prisoners in harsher confinement outweighed 
certain First Amendment liberties.99  The Court emphasized the other 
alternatives available to the prisoners100 and the reasonable balance of 
maintaining safety and restricting the prisoners’ rights.101 
b.  Registered Sex Offenders and Free Speech:  
How the Law Does Not Clarify 
Sex Offenders’ First Amendment Rights 
The analysis of prisoners’ First Amendment rights helps provide context 
for determining the scope of registered sex offenders’ First Amendment 
rights.  For public and prison safety, prisoners have their speech rights 
limited.  Similarly, because sex offenders face additional restrictions 
postincarceration (that other felons may not have), they may be subjected to 
greater speech limitations as well.  There are several important differences, 
however, between prisoners and registered sex offenders.102 
First, many registered sex offenders have already completed their prison 
sentences and are released on probation, parole, or another type of 
supervised release.103 There is an argument that they should not be 
penalized further for prior crimes.104  Second, the broad sweeping bans may 
be an efficient way to handle prison inmates, but they are inequitable for 
offenders whose situations vary greatly. 
Despite these arguments, registered offenders have their rights limited by 
extended restrictions on their behavior in addition to incarceration and 
parole.105  All registered sex offenders are monitored by law enforcement 
through the act of registering.106  There are also places they are not allowed 
to live or work.107  Therefore, it might not seem that offensive to the 
Constitution to limit their speech rights online as well. 
 
 98. See id. at 530. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 532–33 (stating there are reasonable, but not ideal, alternatives). 
 101. See id. at 530–31. 
 102. See Hitz, supra note 44, at 1343. 
 103. See id. at 1335. 
 104. See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1125 (D. Neb. 2012) (holding that 
criminalizing sex offenders’ use of social media, and disclosing Internet identifiers was 
intended to punish sex offenders and therefore violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
 105. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2012). 
 106. See OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, 
REGISTERING, & TRACKING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES 13 (2016); NGA CTR. 
FOR BEST PRACTICES, MANAGING CONVICTED SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 3–7 
(2008). 
 107. See generally Blaisdell, supra note 2. 
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B.  A National Look at Sex Offender Social Media Bans 
To date, there are eleven state statutes that limit or restrict a sex 
offender’s use of social media.108  States restricting an offender’s social 
media usage vary greatly.109  Depending on the state, a violation can range 
from a Class A misdemeanor110 to a Class I felony.111  The statutes do not 
uniformly define “social network,” which means permitted Internet usage 
for sex offenders varies from state to state.  For example, some states have 
broad definitions that can potentially include websites with chat rooms, 
photo sharing, or email functions.112  This can lead to restricted access of 
common news sites, popular email servers, and other non-social networking 
websites.113 
Similarly, the definition of “sex offender” varies.  Some statutes ban 
social media access only if the offender committed crimes against children 
or used the Internet in the commission of the crime.114  Other states choose 
to include all registered sex offenders, without regard to the specific type of 
crime committed or the rate of recidivism for those crimes.115  These 
differences highlight why some statutes pass constitutional muster, while 
others might not. 
Notably, some states have enacted social networking website bans that do 
not apply to all registered sex offenders but only to those convicted of 
certain sex offenses or those who used a computer in the commission of 
their crimes.  New York, Texas, and Minnesota have done this.116  In 
contrast, other states attempted and failed to entirely ban sex offenders’ 
social media use.  Individuals in Indiana, Nebraska, and Louisiana 
successful challenged state statutes that were overly broad in their 
application and the scope of websites prohibited.117 
North Carolina, the focus of this Note, restricts all registered sex 
offenders from using social networking websites.118  A registered sex 
offender challenged the statute’s constitutionality under the First 
 
 108. See NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, RESTRICTION OR BAN OF SOCIAL NETWORKING 
USE FOR SEX OFFENDERS COMPILATION 4–13 (2013), http://www.ndaajustice.org/pdf/ 
Sex%20Offenders%20and%20Social%20Networks_2013.pdf (listing the statutes limiting or 
restricting sex offenders’ use of social media from Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas) 
[https://perma.cc/W6RR-5ALU]. 
 109. See infra Part II.B–E. 
 110. See IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12(b) (2015). 
 111. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2009). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See e.g., State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 753 (N.C. 2015) (Hudson, J., 
dissenting), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). 
 114. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-b) (McKinney 2011), TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 508.1861(a)–(b) (West 2015). 
 115. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-202.5. 
 116. See MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-b); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)–(b). 
 117. See Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1131 (D. Neb. 2012); Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (M.D. La. 
2012). 
 118. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-202.5. 
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Amendment.119  After the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the 
statute,120 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
the statute is constitutional.121  North Carolina’s statute presents an 
opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to provide guidance for state 
legislators. 
To understand the relevant issues of North Carolina’s statute, a more in-
depth comparison of current state legislation is helpful.  Part II.C first 
examines New York, Texas, and Minnesota’s statutes.  It discusses how 
these states properly balance public safety concerns with sex offenders’ 
rights.  Next, it focuses on successful First Amendment challenges brought 
against Indiana’s, Louisiana’s, and Nebraska’s statutes.  Then, Part II.D 
examines how these statutes violated registered sex offenders’ First 
Amendment rights and highlights some of the relevant issues state 
legislators face in drafting legislation.  Part II.E discusses where North 
Carolina fits on the spectrum and presents a basic framework for analyzing 
the statute’s constitutionality. 
C.  States That Got It Right:  How New York, Texas, and Minnesota 
Crafted Constitutional Statutes 
To avoid constitutional concern, states must craft narrowly tailored 
statutes to balance individual liberties with the state’s pursuit of their 
interest.122  The Supreme Court has said, “A statute is narrowly tailored if it 
targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to 
remedy.  A complete ban can be narrowly tailored but only if each activity 
within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil.”123  
Although state governments have articulated compelling state interests in 
protecting children,124 statutes often are overbroad because (1) the 
restrictions burden too many people, (2) the restricted websites included are 
too expansive, and (3) there are not alternative substitutes for the restricted 
websites.125 
Although the relevant statutes vary slightly, New York, Texas, and 
Minnesota offer an alternative to a total ban on sex offenders’ social media 
use.126  These statutes provide a narrowly tailored approach that balances 
public welfare concerns with the speech rights of registered sex offenders. 
 
 119. See State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 
S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). 
 120. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 741. 
 121. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 368. 
 122. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988). 
 123. See id. at 485 (citation omitted). 
 124. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“We have 
recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological 
well-being of minors.”). 
 125. See Hitz, supra note 44, at 1351. 
 126. See MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (4-b) (McKinney 
2011), TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)–(b) (West 2015). 
1844 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
1.  New York 
In New York, access to social networking websites is dependent on the 
type of offense committed and risk of reoffending, as designated by tier.127  
The statute prohibits social media access to registered sex offenders who 
committed an offense against a minor, have the greatest rate of reoffending, 
or who used the Internet to facilitate the commission of a crime.128  New 
York defines a commercial social networking site as any site owned by any 
business or entity that allows people under eighteen to create Web pages or 
profiles that provide information about themselves.129  The site must also 
allow direct or real-time communication (in essence, a chat room or instant 
messenger) with people under eighteen.130  The statute makes clear that the 
definition of a restricted social networking website does not include 
websites that have activities not explicitly enumerated in the statute.131  
This statute is narrowly tailored because it does not burden more people 
than necessary and keeps the scope of restricted websites to a minimum. 
2.  Texas 
Adopting a similar approach, Texas restricts social networking website 
access depending upon the type of offense committed or the type of 
offender.132  The statute restricts the access of high-risk sex offenders and 
those who used computers in the commission of their crimes.133  Texas 
defines a social networking website as an Internet website that allows users, 
through the creation of online profiles, to provide personal information to 
the public, or to other users of the Internet website.134  Further, the website 
must have the primary purpose of facilitating online social interactions to be 
considered a social networking site.135  Additionally, the statute permits 
registered sex offenders to access social networking sites if they are at risk 
of losing their jobs or suffering other undue hardships as a result of the 
restriction.136  This statute is also narrowly tailored because it burdens only 
specific offenders, keeps the scope of restricted websites to a minimum, and 
provides an “undue hardship” caveat for offenders who may be struggling 
with integrating back into society. 
3.  Minnesota 
Minnesota limited its social networking website ban to sex offenders who 
pose a higher risk to the community—those placed on “intensive supervised 
 
 127. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-b). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861 (West 2015). 
 133. See id. § 508.1861(a)–(b). 
 134. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.0061 (West 2009). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(b). 
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release.”137  These offenders are not only prohibited from using social 
networking sites but are banned from using instant messaging programs, 
chat rooms that permit people under eighteen to become a member, or 
maintaining a personal Web page.138  This statute is very narrowly tailored 
because it is applicable to only one category of high-risk offenders and 
defines restricted websites narrowly.139 
Although these statutes vary slightly, they provide an alternative to a 
total ban on sex offenders’ social media use through narrowly tailored 
approaches that balance protection of children with sex offenders’ rights. 
These statutes restrict the speech of sex offenders who have a high 
likelihood of reoffending or who used the Internet to commit their crime of 
conviction.140  They restrict only websites whose primary function is to 
operate as a social networking website.  These nuances in statutory 
language create clear guidelines for offenders and maintain a balance 
between public safety and offenders’ rights. 
D.  States That Got It Wrong:  How Indiana’s, Louisiana’s, 
and Nebraska’s Statutes Failed to Pass Constitutional Muster 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, various states attempted to ban sex 
offenders entirely from accessing social networking websites.  Indiana, 
Louisiana, and Nebraska enacted statutes that were ultimately struck down 
as unconstitutional because they were not narrowly tailored enough.141 
1.  Indiana 
The Indiana statute, passed in 2012, applied to all registered sex 
offenders.142  The law did not distinguish based on the victim’s age, how 
the crime was committed, or the time since the original offense.143  The 
statute banned offenders from using social networking websites,144 instant 
messaging programs, and chat rooms.145 
 
 137. See MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (2016). 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-b) (McKinney 2011); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 508.1861(a)–(b). 
 141. See Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1131 (D. Neb. 2012); Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (M.D. La. 
2012). 
 142. See Doe, 705 F.3d at 696. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Under the statute: 
A “social networking web site” means an Internet web site that:  (1) facilitates the 
social introduction between two or more persons; (2) requires a person to register 
or create an account, a username, or a password to become a member of the web 
site and to communicate with other members; (3) allows a member to create a web 
page or a personal profile; and (4) provides a member with the opportunity to 
communicate with another person.  The term does not include an electronic mail 
program or message board program. 
Id. at 695 n.1. 
 145. See id. at 695–96. 
1846 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
In Doe v. Prosecutor,146 the Seventh Circuit found the Indiana statute 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it lacked narrow 
tailoring under intermediate scrutiny.147  The statute failed to target the evil 
of improper communications to minors.148 
The statute banned sex offenders from all social media rather than just 
solicitation of minors through social media.149  In effect, the statute 
burdened substantially more individuals and more speech than necessary to 
serve the intended interest of protecting children.150  The court also found 
the statute too burdensome because Indiana had other ways of addressing 
communication between minors and sex offenders, specifically, the 
solicitation of a minor was already a crime in Indiana.151  The Seventh 
Circuit ultimately found the statute would not stop sex offenders from 
engaging in illegal activity and the ban prohibited too much expressive 
conduct.152  Indiana revised its statute in 2013 and provided amendments 
that incorporated the Seventh Circuit’s narrowing suggestions.153 
2.  Louisiana 
In contrast to the Indiana statute, the Louisiana statute applied to specific 
registered sex offenders who were convicted of indecent behavior with 
juveniles, pornography involving juveniles, computer-aided solicitation of a 
minor, or video voyeurism.154  The statute banned all registered sex 
offenders from accessing social networking websites, chat rooms, and peer-
to-peer networks.155  Like the Seventh Circuit, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court found the statute unconstitutional because it was overbroad and not 
narrowly tailored to balance offenders’ rights with the government 
interest.156 
The restriction on the offenders’ use of social networking sites was 
unrelated to the activity the statute sought to prohibit because the statute 
imposed a sweeping ban on many commonly used non-social networking 
websites.157  The court reasoned that the statute failed to leave alternative 
channels of communication by banning access to many non-social 
networking websites.158  The court found this problematic because it failed 
to address the statute’s goal and involved a greater intrusion on registered 
 
 146. 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 147. See id. at 695. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. at 699. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 701. 
 153. See IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12 (2014).  Indiana revised its statute to penalize sex 
offenders only for the solicitation of minors through social networking websites and not for 
the use of social networking websites. See id. 
 154. See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 599–600 (M.D. La. 2012). 
 155. See id. at 599. 
 156. See id. at 605. 
 157. See id. at 606. 
 158. See id. 
2017] UPDATING THE SOCIAL NETWORK 1847 
sex offenders’ First Amendment rights than what was reasonably 
necessary.159  The court also found it confusing for those seeking to comply 
with the statute because it was unclear which websites are prohibited.160 
3.  Nebraska 
Passed in 2010, the Nebraska statute applied to registered sex offenders 
who committed sex offenses involving a minor.161  The statute banned 
registered sex offenders from knowingly and intentionally using a social 
networking website, instant messaging service, or chat room that permitted 
minors.162 
In Doe v. Nebraska,163 the court found the statute unconstitutional 
because it was insufficiently tailored to target offenders who pose a risk to 
children by use of social media.164  The court noted how restricting social 
media use affected offenders’ ability to read the news; video chat with other 
people; participate in discussions of a religious, political, or personal 
nature; and professionally network.165  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
the statute was not narrowly tailored because it restricted too many websites 
that were not social media websites and failed to leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication that would afford sex offenders’ the 
same platforms for expression.166  
Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska’s statutes were unconstitutional 
because they were not narrowly tailored in their application or scope of 
websites prohibited or they failed to leave open ample alternatives.167  
Taken together, the cases provide a solid framework to analyze North 
Carolina’s statute at issue in State v. Packingham.168  Before analyzing the 
case, an in-depth look at the challenged statute is necessary. 
E.  A Troubling Case:  How North Carolina’s Statute 
Creates Constitutional Concerns 
On December 1, 2008, the North Carolina legislature passed section 14-
202.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes.169  It broadly prohibits all 
 
 159. See id. at 607. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093, 1094–95 (D. Neb. 2012).  The 
following offenses required registration:  kidnapping of a minor; sexual assault of a child in 
the first degree; sexual assault of a child in the second or third degree; incest of a minor; 
pandering of a minor; visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct of a child; possessing any 
visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct; criminal child enticement; child enticement by 
means of an electronic communication device; enticement by electronic communication; or 
an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned offenses. See id. at 1094. 
 162. See id. 
 163. 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Neb. 2012). 
 164. See id. at 1111. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 1109. 
 167. See Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 2013); Doe, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 
1131; Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (M.D. La. 2012). 
 168. 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). 
 169. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-202.5 (2009). 
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registered sex offenders from accessing “a commercial social networking 
Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children 
to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.”170 
The statute does not restrict itself to sex offenders who used computers in 
the commission of their crimes or who are at a particularly high risk for 
recidivism.  Instead, North Carolina’s statute requires every registered sex 
offender—those under supervision and those not under supervision, high-
risk offenders and low-risk offenders, those who committed Internet-related 
sex offenses and those who did not commit Internet-related sex offenses—
to refrain from using social networking websites.171  This broad application 
of the statute creates constitutional concerns for offenders, and it appears to 
mirror Indiana’s and Louisiana’s statutes before they were struck down for 
being impermissible restrictions on speech.172 
Under North Carolina’s statute, a “commercial social networking Web 
site” is defined as an Internet site that meets the following requirements: 
(1) Is operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, 
advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the Web site. 
(2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the 
purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges. 
(3) Allows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain 
information such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed 
on the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about 
the user, and links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social 
networking Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be 
accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site. 
(4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social networking Web 
site mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message 
board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger.173 
Under this broad definition, registered sex offenders are not allowed to 
access sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn, Instagram, 
Reddit, MySpace, and Snapchat.174  The statute also likely includes sites 
like Foodnetwork.com and even the websites for the New York Times and 
North Carolina’s News & Observer.175  The statute may even bar sex 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id.; Jasmine S. Wynton, Myspace, Yourspace, but Not Theirspace:  The 
Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Networking Sites, 60 DUKE L.J. 
1859, 1867–68 (2011). 
 172. See supra Part II.D.1–2. 
 173. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(b). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 753 (N.C. 2015) (Hudson, J., dissenting), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016); see also Terms of Service, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 9, 
2015), http://www.newsobserver.com/customer-service/terms-of-service/ (stating that “[i]f 
you are under eighteen (18) then you may only use NewsObserver.com with the consent of a 
parent or legal guardian” but not limiting registration on the site to adults) 
[https://perma.cc/D6WX-U83Y]. 
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offenders from using Amazon and Google.176  The legislature attempted to 
balance this broad definition by requiring that the offender must know that 
the website permits minors to become members.177  Even so, the statute 
raises constitutional concerns, and these concerns are demonstrated in 
Packingham. 
III:  PACKINGHAM V. NORTH CAROLINA:  
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
TO CLARIFY FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTIONS 
In State v. Packingham,178 Packingham, a registered sex offender, was 
convicted of violating a North Carolina statute that restricts all registered 
sex offenders from accessing social networking websites.179  He challenged 
the statute’s constitutionality under the First Amendment.180 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional, 
applying intermediate scrutiny.181  On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court reversed and upheld the statute, finding it to be sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to pass intermediate scrutiny while providing ample alternative 
channels of communication.182  Packingham appealed, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 28, 2016. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari is important because 
this is a case of first impression; the Supreme Court has never ruled on 
whether statutes that ban access to social networking websites are 
constitutional under the First Amendment.  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
must address what constitutes a narrowly tailored statute and what qualifies 
as ample alternative channels of communication.  Using the framework 
from cases challenging similar statutes,183 this Note analyzes North 
Carolina’s Supreme Court decision in Packingham and examines whether 
North Carolina’s statute is constitutional. 
 
 176. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 400 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (finding the definition 
of restricted websites confusing and overbroad).  The statute does exempt from this 
definition any website that “[h]as as its primary purpose the facilitation of commercial 
transactions involving goods or services between its members or visitors.” N.C. GEN STAT. 
§ 14-202.5(c)(2). However, Amazon’s primary purpose is to facilitate transactions between 
Amazon itself and its visitors, not between Amazon users.  Accordingly, it appears that this 
exception may not apply to websites like Amazon but does apply to websites like Craigslist 
or eBay. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d. at 754 n.2. 
 177. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5. 
 178. 748 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). 
 179. See id. at 149. 
 180. See id. at 149–50.  Packingham brought other constitutional challenges, but this Note 
focuses solely on his First Amendment free speech challenge. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 747–48. 
 183. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Personal Profile of State v. Packingham 
In 2002, Lester Packingham was convicted and required to register as a 
sex offender in North Carolina.184  In 2010, the Durham Police Department 
investigated profiles on social networking websites like Myspace and 
Facebook for evidence of use by registered sex offenders.185  An officer 
recognized Packingham on a Facebook profile and subsequently arrested 
him for accessing a social networking website.186  Packingham was indicted 
for violating North Carolina General Statutes, chapter 14, section 202.5, 
which makes it a felony for registered sex offenders to access any 
commercial social networking website that does not restrict membership to 
adults.187  Ultimately, a jury found Packingham guilty,188 and he appealed 
to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina.189 
On appeal, Packingham challenged the North Carolina statute’s 
constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.190  He 
alleged that the statute violated his right to free speech, expression, 
association, assembly, and the press.191  He asserted the statute was 
overbroad, vague, and not narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate 
government interest.192  The North Carolina Court of Appeals issued a 
thoughtful opinion striking down the statute.193 
B.  Not Narrow Enough:  The North Carolina Court of Appeals 
Declares the Statute Unconstitutional 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the statute was a 
content-neutral, time, place, or manner regulation of speech and analyzed it 
under intermediate scrutiny.194  To pass intermediate scrutiny as a time, 
place, or manner restriction, the statute must be narrowly tailored and leave 
open ample alternative channels of communication.195  The court found the 
statute was not narrowly tailored, unconstitutionally vague, and overbroad 
in failing to target the evil it intended to rectify.196  The court held the 
statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied.197 
The court’s opinion focused on defining what constitutes a narrowly 
tailored statute and how North Carolina’s statute failed when examined 
closely.198  The court found the statute was not narrowly tailored because it 
 
 184. See Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146. 
 185. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 742. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Packingham, 748 S.E.2d at 149; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2009). 
 188. See Packingham, 748 S.E.2d at 149. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. at 149–50. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. at 150. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 154. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. at 150–52. 
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was too broad in its application and too broad in the scope of activities it 
restricted.199   
The court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored in its 
application in that it treated all registered sex offenders equally, regardless 
of the offense committed or the likelihood of reoffending.200  It burdened 
more people than needed to achieve the purported goal of the statute.201  
The court of appeals also found that the statute was not narrowly tailored, 
because it prohibited wide use of sites that are not social networking 
sites.202  Sites such as Google and Amazon are potentially inaccessible 
because these sites contain secondary pages that derive revenue from 
advertising,203 facilitate the social introduction of two or more people,204 
and allow individuals to create personal profiles, email accounts, or 
comment on message boards or review pages.205  The statute prohibited 
access to websites with these characteristics, restricting far more websites 
than necessary to achieve the goal of the statute.206 
North Carolina appealed the court of appeals decision to the state’s 
supreme court.207  The North Carolina Supreme Court took the appeal208 
and, in a controversial decision, reversed the court of appeals.209 
C.  The North Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 
Holds That the Statute Is Constitutional 
In a 5–2 decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the statute 
as a content-neutral regulation of conduct, only incidentally burdening 
speech.210  It analyzed the statute under the O’Brien analysis and upheld 
it.211 
The court first determined that the statute is a content-neutral regulation 
of conduct—specifically, regulating an offender’s ability to access certain 
and specific websites.212  The court then applied the four-prong test from 
O’Brien to determine whether the regulation of conduct was sufficiently 
 
 199. See id. at 152–54. 
 200. See id. at 152. 
 201. See id. at 152–53. 
 202. See id. at 152. 
 203. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(b)(1) (2009). 
 204. See id. § 14-202.5(b)(2). 
 205. See id. § 14-202.5(b)(3). 
 206. See id. § 14-202.5. 
 207. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 742. 
 208. Id. 
 209. The procedural history of Packingham’s case illustrates different ways of 
characterizing these statutes. See Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Agrees to Consider N.C. 
Ban on Sex Offenders’ Access to Most Prominent Social Networks, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/28/supreme-
court-agrees-to-consider-n-c-ban-on-sex-offenders-access-to-most-prominent-social-
networks/ [https://perma.cc/7G4B-9G8W]. 
 210. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 738. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. at 744. 
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justified.213  After concluding that the statute satisfied the first three prongs, 
the court found the fourth prong of the O’Brien test could be satisfied if the 
statute was both narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 
and provided ample alternative channels of communication.214  The 
analysis of the fourth prong was similar to the analysis that the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals conducted.215  
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the statute was narrowly 
tailored in its applicability because it “establishes four specific criteria that 
must be met in order for a commercial social networking Web site to be 
prohibited.”216  The statute also entirely exempts websites exclusively 
devoted to speech, such as instant messaging services and chat rooms, and 
websites with the primary purpose of facilitating commercial transactions of 
goods or services between its members or visitors.217  The court also 
provided examples of various non-social networking websites that serve 
essentially the same purpose as those restricted under the statute.218 
The court solidified its decision by noting that the primary purpose of the 
statute is to prevent offenders from having the opportunity to gather 
information about minors.219  The specific criteria prevent offenders from 
gathering information, thereby “addressing the [exact] evil that the statute 
seeks to prevent.”220  The court ultimately concluded the statute was 
narrowly tailored, provided ample alternatives,221 and was not 
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.222 
Drawing upon the language from the court of appeals’s opinion, Justice 
Robin Hudson wrote a dissent that concluded that the statute was not 
narrowly tailored to pass intermediate scrutiny.223 
 
 213. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 
746. 
 214. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 746.  The court combined the fourth factor of the 
O’Brien test, which requires that the least restrictive means be used, with the language in 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), and McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518 (2014), which required that regulations be narrowly tailored and the government 
demonstrate that less restrictive alternative measures would fail to achieve the government’s 
interests. Id. 
 215. See State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 154 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 
S.E.2d 738. 
 216. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 747. 
 217. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(c) (2009). 
 218. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 747–48. 
 219. See id. at 745. 
 220. See id. at 747. 
 221. See id.  The court responded to the defendant’s list of restricted non-social 
networking websites by providing similar (although less popular) websites.  For example, 
accessing LinkedIn may be prohibited, but the court offered Glassdoor.com, a similar but 
less popular professional networking website, as a substitute. Id. 
 222. See id. at 749–51; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (“A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of 
others.”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (“One to whose conduct a statute clearly 
applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”). 
 223. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 749–51 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
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D.  Who Got It Right?:  The United State Supreme Court 
Steps in to Determine the Statute’s Fate 
On October 28, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
Packingham’s appeal.224  The main issue before the Court is whether North 
Carolina’s statute, on its face or as applied, is constitutional under the First 
Amendment.225  This Note focuses on the facial challenge, but the analysis 
and framework is also useful for the as-applied challenge.226 
1.  Content Based v. Content Neutral 
To resolve the facial challenge, the Court must first determine whether 
the statute regulates expression on its face and then whether it is content 
neutral.227  As noted previously, statutes that regulate speech and are 
content based are subject to exacting scrutiny,228 whereas statutes that 
regulate speech and are content neutral (time, place, or manner restrictions) 
or those statutes that regulate conduct and burden speech incidentally229 are 
examined under intermediate scrutiny.230 
In this case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the 
statute directly regulated speech and was content neutral but found it 
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny.231  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court, however, determined the statute was content neutral but 
regulated conduct and incidentally burdened speech, and it upheld the 
statute.232 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s initial determination of whether North 
Carolina’s statute is content based or content neutral will influence its 
analysis because it will determine whether the Court applies strict or 
intermediate scrutiny.233  After determining the level of scrutiny, however, 
the important question is whether the statute is narrowly tailored and leaves 
 
 224. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 368. 
 225. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 15-1194).  
 226. Constitutional challenges can be sorted into two categories:  facial challenges and as-
applied challenges. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988).  
A facial attack contends that no application of the statute would be constitutional. Id.  In 
contrast, an individual bringing an as-applied challenge maintains that an otherwise valid 
statute is unconstitutional as applied to that individual. See Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. 
Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 n.16 (Tex. 1995). 
 227. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 228.  See supra Parts II.A.1, III.A–B; see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 
(1992). 
 229. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 230. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). 
 231. See State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 154 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 
S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016); see also supra Part III.A–B. 
 232. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 740, 743; see also supra notes 210–23 and 
accompanying text. 
 233. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of 
Speech:  Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49, 53 (2000) 
(noting that “increasingly in free speech law, the central inquiry is whether the government 
action is content-based or content-neutral”). 
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open ample alternative channels of communication to registered sex 
offenders. 
Overwhelmingly, courts have determined that statutes like North 
Carolina’s are content-neutral regulations.234  This is because the statutes 
restrict the sex offenders’ speech by denying them the ability to 
communicate via social media without reference to what the offenders’ 
would actually say on social media.235  Consequently, it is likely that the 
Supreme Court will analyze the statute as a content-neutral regulation and 
will impose intermediate scrutiny.236  From here, the Court’s analysis may 
depend on whether the Court determines that the statute regulates speech 
directly or regulates conduct and places an incidental burden on speech. 
If the Court determines the statute is a content-neutral regulation of 
speech or expression, then the regulation is a time, place, or manner 
restriction.237  To be constitutional, these restrictions must serve a 
significant government interest, be narrowly tailored, and leave open ample 
alternative channels for communicating the information.238  The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the statute was a time, place, and 
manner restriction, but it found that the statute failed to pass intermediate 
scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored.239 
In contrast, if the Court determines the statute regulates conduct but 
incidentally burdens speech, it will apply the four-factor test from O’Brien 
to determine whether the statute is sufficiently justified.240 
In this case, the statute would satisfy the first two O’Brien factors 
because it is within the constitutional power of the government and furthers 
a substantial governmental interest.241  North Carolina has the authority to 
enact laws, and there is no question that the state has an important interest 
in protecting minors.242  The statute would likely satisfy the third factor 
 
 234. See supra Part II.C–D. 
 235. See Doe v. Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 236. If the Supreme Court determines North Carolina’s statute is a content-based 
regulation, it will most likely be deemed unconstitutional.  To pass strict scrutiny, the statute 
must be narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. See 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  Regulations based on the content 
of speech trigger strict scrutiny and are presumptively unconstitutional. See Packingham, 
777 S.E.2d at 744.  North Carolina’s statute would most likely fail under strict scrutiny.  
First, the statute burdens more people than necessary to achieve its purported goal and is not 
narrowly tailored. See Packingham, 748 S.E.2d at 154.  The statute prohibits all registered 
offenders from accessing social networking websites, regardless of the underlying offense 
which required registry.  Second, because the statute applies to all offenders and permits no 
exceptions, it lacks the flexibility necessary to address unique situations.  There are better 
alternatives to achieving these interests, as other states have enacted less restrictive statutes. 
See supra Part II.C. 
 237. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See Packingham, 748 S.E.2d at 150. 
 240. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 
746. 
 241. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 746. 
 242. Id. 
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because the interest in protecting children from the potential harm is 
unrelated to the suppression of the offender’s speech.243 
From here, the Supreme Court’s analysis could move in a few different 
directions.  First, the Supreme Court could examine the fourth O’Brien 
factor independently and assess whether the incidental burden on First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is necessary in the furtherance of 
the state interest.244  More likely, the Supreme Court will, as the North 
Carolina Supreme Court did, find the fourth factor satisfied if the statute is 
both narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest and 
provides ample alternative channels of communication.245 
Under either determination—whether the Court finds the statute a 
regulation of general conduct or a direct (but content-neutral) regulation of 
speech—the Supreme Court must decide whether the statute is narrowly 
tailored and provides ample alternative channels of communication.  
Further, the Supreme Court will likely use this test because North Carolina, 
in it its brief to the Supreme Court, presented its statute as a time, place, and 
manner restriction of sex offenders and not a regulation of conduct.246  
Therefore, it is likely the Court will apply this test.  But the outcome of this 
test is not clear; the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the statute 
was not narrowly tailored enough, and struck it down without considering 
whether the statute left open ample alternative channels.247  In contrast, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court found the statute was narrowly tailored and 
provided ample alternative channels of communication.248  Both opinions 
provide arguments for the U.S. Supreme Court to consider in analyzing the 
statute. 
2.  Narrow Tailoring 
Under the standard announced in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,249 a 
statute is “narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the 
exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”250  The Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina found that the North Carolina statute was not narrowly 
tailored under this definition, because it burdened more people than 
necessary and prohibited use of non-social networking sites like Google and 
 
 243. See id.  The North Carolina Supreme Court did not include an in-depth exploration 
of the first three O’Brien factors because they were not questioned by the court. See id. 
 244. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 245. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 747–48; see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518, 2540 (2014); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 246. See Brief for the Respondent at 15, Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 15-1194).  As 
mentioned previously, time, place, and manner restrictions must be narrowly tailored and 
provide ample alternative channels of communication. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 247. See State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 150 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 
S.E.2d 738. 
 248. See Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 747. 
 249. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 250. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). 
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Amazon.251  The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, found that the 
statute was narrowly tailored because it “established four specific criteria 
that must be met in order for a commercial social networking Web Sites to 
be prohibited.”252  Moreover, the statute exempted websites, instant 
messaging services, and chat rooms that were devoted exclusively to 
speech.253  The U.S. Supreme Court must consider these two approaches 
when determining whether the statute is narrowly tailored. 
3.  Ample Alternative Channels of Communication 
The Supreme Court must determine whether the statute leaves open 
ample alternative channels of communications.  The North Carolina Court 
of Appeals did not need to address this prong because it concluded that the 
statute suffered from both audience and content overbreadth.  Thus, it did 
not pass the narrow tailoring requirement.254  The North Carolina Supreme 
Court disagreed and additionally found that the statute provided ample 
alternative channels of communication to the websites prohibited under the 
statute.255  But the “ample alternative channels” requirement presents a 
larger issue for the U.S. Supreme Court:  lower court decisions have split on 
how this requirement is understood.256  The Court should address this issue. 
City of Ladue v. Gilleo257 provides guidance in determining whether a 
speech restriction leaves open ample alternative channels of 
communication.258  In Gilleo, the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance 
that banned homeowners from displaying signs on their property.259  The 
Court concluded that the ordinance did not leave open “adequate 
substitutes” for the important medium of speech that it foreclosed.260  While 
the city argued that the ordinance left people free to convey their desired 
messages by other means,261 the Court found the alternatives inadequate.262  
The alternatives conveyed substantively different messages, were not as 
cost effective, or failed to reach the speaker’s intended audience.263  This 
decision created some confusion as to the definition of “ample alternative 
channels of communication.” 
 
 251. See supra Part III.B. 
 252. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 747; see also supra Part III.C. 
 253. See supra Part III.C. 
 254. See State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 150 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 
S.E.2d 738. 
 255. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 747–48. 
 256. Brief Amici Curiae of Ashutosh Bhagwat et al. in Support of Petitioners at 9–12, 
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 15-1194). 
 257. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
 258. See id. at 54–56. 
 259. See id. at 47–48. 
 260. See id. at 56. 
 261. See id. The city claimed that ordinance provided adequate alternatives such as hand-
held signs, letters, handbills, flyers, telephone calls, newspaper advertisements, bumper 
stickers, speeches, and neighborhood or community meetings. See id. 
 262. See id. 
 263. See id. at 57. 
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The Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have held that alternative channels 
are adequate only if the speaker reaches essentially the same audience 
through reasonable means.264  The Second and Ninth Circuits have 
conflicting precedents.265  The North Carolina Supreme Court decision adds 
to this confusion because the court found ample alternatives even when 
access is prohibited to an entire subcategory (social networking websites) of 
a protected medium (the Internet).  Because the Internet is a constantly 
evolving medium of protected speech, this decision presents an opportunity 
for the Supreme Court to resolve the inconsistent interpretations and 
provide guidance for future decisions. 
E.  A Comment on the Case:  
The Unbearable Burden of North Carolina’s Statute 
In light of these issues, the North Carolina statute is unconstitutional 
because it is a content-neutral statute that regulates expression but is not 
narrowly tailored enough to meet intermediate scrutiny.  It violates the First 
Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored nor does it provide ample 
alternative channels of communication.  North Carolina’s statute highlights 
the unanswered questions that all future legislation must address:  Who falls 
under these statutes’ purview?  How much behavior is restricted?  What 
alternatives are available?266  These questions are crucial for state 
legislators to consider when drafting legislation, and North Carolina failed 
to answer them in crafting this statute. 
 
 264. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1312 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (holding that there were not ample alternative channels and, consequently, the ban 
significantly limited the size of the audience); Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 
1042–43 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding broadly that an alternative channel is not adequate if it 
forecloses the ability to reach one audience even if it allows the speaker to reach other 
groups); Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that ample alternatives must include reasonably priced and effective alternatives). 
 265. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 698–99 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the 
complete ban on artists to sell their work in public spaces without a license failed to leave 
open ample alternative channels of communication); Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 
914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990)  (stating that “[a]n alternative is not ample if the speaker 
is not permitted to reach the ‘intended audience’”). But see Marcavage v. City of New York, 
689 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that an ordinance, which required a 
demonstration zone not to be within sight and sound of the intended audience, still provided 
ample alternatives); Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 437 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding a restriction on students displaying printed messages on their school clothing left 
open ample alternatives).  The Second Circuit’s speech-restrictive Marcavage decision does 
not discuss the speech-protective ample alternative channels analysis in Bery, and the Ninth 
Circuit’s speech-restrictive Jacobs decision does not discuss the speech-protective ample 
alternative channels analysis in Bay Area Peace Navy. See Brief Amici Curiae of Ashutosh 
Bhagwat et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 256, at 18–19. 
 266. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 584 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“And whatever 
the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic 
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not 
vary when a new and different medium for communication appears.”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (observing that previous cases from that Court “provide no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied” to online 
activities); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). 
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North Carolina’s statute is fatally flawed for two reasons:  it is overbroad 
as to audience and to speech.  The statute does not consider the underlying 
offense of an offender when denying access to one of the main mediums of 
speech available today; it is not tied to the protection of minors when it 
restricts offenders who are not a threat to minors.  For example, if an 
individual is required to register as a sex offender in another state (e.g., for 
public urination),267 and then moves to North Carolina, North Carolina 
requires the individual to register, and he is now no longer allowed access 
to social networking websites due to a crime unrelated to harming 
minors.268  Further, some offenders may not have used the Internet in the 
facilitation of their crime, yet they are restricted from accessing websites 
that are fundamental to their integration into society, such as LinkedIn.269  
Although the protection of children is of chief importance, the statute must 
be crafted narrowly to avoid unconstitutionally infringing upon people’s 
rights. 
The statute is overly restrictive in its scope of websites prohibited.  
Websites such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram are clearly 
prohibited.  But less obvious sites such as Google or Amazon may be 
prohibited as well.270  The statute’s broad (and unclear) language captures 
many non-social networking websites and makes it difficult for offenders to 
determine which websites are accessible.  For these reasons, it is clear that 
the statute is not narrowly tailored and therefore unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment. 
The statute is also unconstitutional for failing to leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication.  The suggested alternatives271 do 
not rise to the level of expression that is communicated and absorbed on 
Facebook, Twitter, the New York Times Web page, and similar unique 
platforms.  Like Gilleo, there is no adequate alternative to the 
communicative impact of the forbidden social media.272 
Although alternate channels of communication exist, they may not be 
adequate substitutes for the channels prohibited.  Because of their 
uniqueness and core expressive content, there are no adequate substitutes 
for the social networking websites foreclosed by the statute.  With all of 
these issues before the Court, this statute cannot be reconciled with prior 
jurisprudence, and it fails intermediate scrutiny when thrust into the 
constitutional light. 
 
 267. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(17) (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290(c), 
314 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(c)(14) (2015).  South Carolina also makes 
consensual anal intercourse between two adults a registerable offense. See S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-3-430(C)(11).  This would permit North Carolina to deny social networking website 
access to any individual convicted under section 23-3-430(c)(11) who later decides to reside 
in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.6(4)(b) (2015). 
 268. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.6(4)(b). 
 269. See State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 753 (N.C. 2015) (Hudson, J., dissenting), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). 
 270. See id. at 753–54. 
 271. See id. at 747. 
 272. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994). 
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IV:  WHAT NEXT?:  
THE PATH TO CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 
North Carolina’s statute provides relevant issues for state legislators to 
consider when drafting legislation.  Social networking restrictions should be 
allowed when they are narrowly tailored to apply to specific offenders, 
restrict only social networking sites, and provide offenders with ample 
alternatives.  This will minimize the liberty deprivations of the released 
offenders while addressing public safety concerns.  But in light of the 
challenges discussed in this Note, many states lack statutory language 
regarding social networking restrictions for sex offenders. 
This Note proposes a model statute for states to consider, set forth in the 
appendix.273  The model statute clearly states to whom it applies so as to 
avoid conflicting statutory interpretations.  It applies to offenders whose 
underlying offense involved minors, those who used the Internet in the 
facilitation of their crime, or offenders whose risk of recidivism is high.  
However, the statute does not define who qualifies as a sex offender or 
which sex offenses should be covered under the statute; the state legislative 
body can use its discretion to define the applicable offender and offenses. 
The model statute also determines the scope of restricted activities with 
clear and concise language.  It defines a social networking site narrowly, 
while providing authoritative bodies (such as judges, parole boards, or 
parole officers) the discretion to redefine what constitutes a social 
networking website.  For example, a statute can define social networking 
website by focusing on the “primary purpose” of the website and examining 
the type of activities on the website.  Clear language regarding prohibited 
websites will aid in defining available alternatives. 
The statute also has some flexibility to adjust restrictions for work-
related purposes, undue hardship, or parental involvement.  By doing so, the 
statute addresses the difficulties many offenders face in integrating into 
society—if a website is needed for a job, a registered sex offender will still 
be allowed to use it to avoid losing employment.  He can bring his petition 
to the court, the parole board, or a parole officer for relief. 
Finally, the statute allows for future technological advancements.  This 
serves two purposes:  (1) it creates flexibility for the courts, parole boards, 
and parole officers to respond to technological advancements without the 
statute becoming invalid and (2) it prevents offenders from being able to 
take advantage of loopholes created by the statute or the release process. 
In conclusion, an ideal statute must offer state legislatures a narrowly 
tailored but flexible approach to address the balance of First Amendment 
rights with public safety concerns.  The regulation of Internet expression is 
a difficult path to navigate because the medium continues to evolve faster 
than the law can adapt.  The lack of corresponding evolution between the 
law and the Internet should not provide a haven for unconstitutional laws.  
Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska, and potentially North Carolina, 
 
 273. See infra Appendix. 
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demonstrate that poorly worded statutes can deprive many of their 
fundamental rights.  Moving forward, states must consider these issues 
when enacting legislation to both protect the virtual communities and those 
who wish to access them. 
APPENDIX 
SECTION [X]:  MANDATORY CONDITIONS FOR SEX OFFENDERS: 
1. The court shall require, as a mandatory condition of release, that 
certain registered sex offenders be prohibited from accessing social 
networking websites. 
2. This section applies only to those registered sex offenders who: 
 (a) Were convicted of an offense for which registration as a sex 
offender is required pursuant to [the applicable law], and the 
victim of such offense was under the age of eighteen at the time 
of such offense or 
 (b) [Such person] has been designated a level-three sex offender 
pursuant [to the applicable law or SORNA] or 
 (c) Used the Internet or any other type of electronic device used for 
Internet access to commit the offense or engage in the conduct for 
which the person was convicted. 
3. As used in this section a “social networking website” shall mean: 
 (a) Any business, organization, or other entity operating a website 
that permits persons under eighteen years of age to be registered 
users, and whose website has the primary purpose of establishing 
personal relationships with other users, where people may: 
 (1) create Web pages or profiles that provide personal 
information and that such pages or profiles are available 
to the public or to other users; 
 (2) facilitate a social introduction between two or more 
persons for the purposes of friendship, meeting other 
persons, or information exchanges; 
 (3) engage in direct, real time, delayed communication 
with other users, such as a chat room or instant 
messenger, and commenting on or “liking” information 
shared; and 
 (4) communicate with persons under eighteen years of 
age. 
 (b) However, a social networking website shall not include: 
(1) Websites that permit users to engage in activities 
other than those enumerated above, or 
(2) Websites whose primary purpose is facilitating 
commercial transactions involving goods or services 
between its members, between members and itself, and 
between members and visitors or third parties. 
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 (c) The [court, parole board, parole officer] has the authority to 
determine whether a website is considered a social networking 
website under this section. 
4. Upon petition for relief by the registered offender, the [court, parole 
board, parole officer] may modify, at any time, the condition in 
[subsection 2] if: 
 (a) the condition interferes with the offender’s ability to attend 
school or to become or remain employed, and constitutes an 
undue hardship for the offender; or 
 (b) the offender is the parent or guardian of an individual who is 
under the age of eighteen years and the offender is not otherwise 
prohibited from communicating with that individual.  If the 
individual under the age of eighteen contests the petition for relief 
sought by the registered offender, the [court, parole board, parole 
officer] may consider this a relevant factor in determining 
whether to lift the condition. 
5. In addition to the mandatory condition in [subsection 2], offenders 
must submit to any other appropriate restrictions concerning the 
person’s use or access of the Internet as dictated by the [court, parole 
board, parole officer]. 
